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Abstract
This paper seeks the most promising approach for reforming the European
copyright regime to introduce more flexibility for transformative uses. We
will consider two reform proposals, both inspired by Canadian law: first, the
introduction of a specific exception for user generated content and second, a more
ambitious transition to a semi-open “fair dealing” exception. We will finally argue
in favor of this second proposal, in the footsteps of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Canada following its landmark CCH Canadian decision.
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This  paper   seeks   the  most  promising approach  for   reforming   the
European   copyright   regime   to   introduce   more   flexibility   for
transformative uses.  We will   consider   two  reform proposals,  both
inspired   by   Canadian   law:   first,   the   introduction   of   a   specific
exception for user generated content and second, a more ambitious
transition to a semi­open  “fair  dealing” exception.  We will   finally

































since   the  Courts  will  probably curtail   the cases  where   free  speech
trumps copyright law to those where a particularly important speech
interest is at stake. But there are many conceivable reuses practices










to   consider   what   are   the   avenues   of   reform   for   limitations   or
exceptions to copyright law.
In   this   respect,   two   proposals   have  mainly   been   discussed   in   the
European   literature.   The   first,   considered   for   some   time   by   the
European Commission, is the introduction of an exception for User





























We will   consider   these   two   avenues   for   reform  in   light   of   recent
















Admittedly,   none   of   these   proposals   constitute   a   panacea.   In
particular,   none   of   these   proposals   addresses   the   issue   of   the
unreasonable   interpretations   of   moral   rights   doctrines   that   often
causes  a   significant  barrier   for   transformative  uses   in  Belgian and
French copyright   law.  However,   this   issue  would  require  extensive
developments   that   clearly   exceeds   the   scope   of   this   article.   A
potential  mitigating   factor   to   this   hurdle   is   the   observation   that







flexibility   for   transformative   uses  inside  the   current   European
framework for exceptions or limitations. At the national level, that


















French   Government6,   called   for   securing   and   encouraging   new
practices of digitial transformative creation, and suggested a number
of  ways   to   do   so   at   the   national   level.  Noting   that   the  French
implementation of the quotation exception is far more restrictive than
what   the   directive   allows7,   the   report   suggests   relying   on   the
flexibility allowed by article 5.3(d) (providing that quotations shall be
made “for purposes  such as  criticism or review”8) to include another




Such   a   solution   is   astute,   but   requires   quite   a   stretch   from   the
ordinary meaning of the words used by the exception. A quotation, in
the ordinary meaning of the term, is an exact excerpt of an original
work.   Introducin   apparently   contradictory   concepts   such   as   a
“creative   or   transformative   quotation”   does   not   seem   like   good
legislative practice.






























directive   does   not   present   the   same   flexibility   as   the   quotation
exception, as it does not contain the words “such as”. While the recent
CJEU   decision   in   the   Deckmyn   case   considerably   relaxed   the
application   of   the   parody   exception,   by   dismissing   a   number   of
restrictive conditions imposed by national courts, and including the
finding of  parody  in  the   freedom of   expression   framework,   it  also
constrained   its   application   by   determining   a   number   of   essential
characteristics   of   parody,   including   that   it   must   “constitute   an

























































































place   for   a   detailed   discussion   of   this   interesting   but   somewhat
puzzling   provision21.  We  will   limit   ourselves   to   a   few   comments.
Broadly speaking, the text of the exception seems mainly concerned
with   guaranteeing   certain   legitimate   interests   of   the   right­holders:
first,   the   moral   interest   that   proper   recognition   is   given   to   the
creator/performer,   and   second,   the   economic   interest   that   the
copyright holder still has an opportunity to enjoy the proper level of
reward  he   could   legitimately   expect   and   that   incentivized  him  to
create the work22. Indeed, this is a fundamental concern in copyright
law,   one   that   the  Canadian   Supreme  Court   acknowledged   in   the
Théberge case23. Arguably, this can also be considered as capturing
the core concern of the three­step test24.















































law enables.  The  Canadian exception provides   such result­oriented
criterion,   with   the   requirement   that   the   use   does   not   have









will   almost   always   be   respected.   In   a   sense,   this   is   what  most
traditional European exceptions do, by spelling out a set of conditions


























other  parts  of   the  Bill29.  Tentative  definitions  have been proposed
elsewhere:   the  Lescure  Report  defines   non­commercial   use   as   uses
“whose dissemination does not provide any direct or indirect revenue
to their authors”30; Creative Commons' popular “NC” license defines it




does   not   seem   by   any  means   impossible.   Indeed,  most   copyright
regimes already rely on similar criteria, such as the assessment of the








of   the   derivative   works)   and   second,   the   requirement   of   a   non­
commercial purpose (which limits the risk of an effect on the author's
market); but it also resort to a direct, result­oriented criterion, which
is  the     “substantial  adverse  effect”   condition,  that   largely  overlaps












































As with   the   second   step   of   the   three­step   test,   it   is   questionable
whether the law should protect any commercial exploitation that the
copyright  holder  could  cover,   or   rather  what   the  copyright  holder
should  cover. If copyright law is not an absolute property right but
rather a right justified by the need to incentivize creation, we should































self­defeating   to   adopt   such   an   overly­stringent   approach   in   an
exception that aims to introduce more flexibility in copyright law.
Compatibility   with   international   law.   –  With   or   without   the




interpreted   (in   an   overtly   stringent   manner,   in   our   opinion)   as
“clearly defined” and “narrow in its scope and reach”39: arguably, user
generated content is as clearly defined and narrowly limited as the
parody   exception,   or   only   slightly   larger.   The   expression   “user
generated   content”40  does   not   encompass   a   general   case   for   any
transformative   uses   but   usually  refers   to   specific   genres,   such   as
remix,   mash­ups41,   memes42,   or   machinima43,   just   as  the   parody










































and   no   unreasonable   prejudice   to   the   legitimate   interests   of   the
author/right   holder).   Whether   the   requirement   of   attribution   is
sufficient,  or   even  necessary,   to   comply  with   the   three­step   test45,
depends on the (rather confusing) issue of the strength of the moral
interests covered by the three­step test46. In any case, the Canadian
UGC   exception   seems   to   constitute   no  more   a   violation   of   the
stringent   interpretation   of   the   three­step   test   than   the   parody
exception.   And   if   the   UGC   exception   satisfies   the   stringent
interpretation of the three­step test, then  a fortiori  it will satisfy a
more balanced interpretation of the test47. 
Desirability.   –  Having   considered   the   compatibility   of   such   an
exception   with   international   law,   what   can   we   say   about   its
desirability?   Does   it   provide   enough   breathing   space   for
transformative   use   practices?   It   would   certainly   be   a   welcome
addition, allowing for some emergent digital practices that are gaining
social   acceptance.   Moreover,   to   the   extent   that   they   are   non­






























in   the   context   of   visual   arts50.  When   these   uses   are   part   of   a
professional   artistic   practices,   the   determination   of   their
(non­)commercial character can be quite thorny. Would a conceptual
art   happening   such   as  Kijkverbod  constitute   a   commercial
exploitation51? Does the public display of work of arts in a gallery, as
in the Ahlberg52 or Kate Moss tattoo cases53 qualify as commercial? In
other   cases,   the   issue   is   clearer:   in   the  Ensor   case54,   the   litigious
transformative   use   was   reproduced   in   a   (commercial)   literary
catalogue, which would probably constitute a commercial use. 
These   types   of   transformative   uses   would   probably   be   more

































b.   Towards   a   semi­open   exception?   The   case   of   the   new
Canadian fair dealing







The   most   remarkable   feature   of   a   fair   use   exception,   which
distinguishes it from European­style exceptions as well as traditional
fair use exception, is that the list of authorized purposes is open. The
wording  of   the  American   fair   use   exception  makes   clear   that   the
enumerated  list  of  purposes   is   illustrative,  not comprehensive:   “the
fair use of a copyrighted work (…)  for purposes such as criticism,



























The   Canadian   semi­open   “fair   dealing”.   –  Although   the   open
exception model   is   certainly  interesting and worth considering,  we
want   to   discuss   an   alternative   approach,   also   pointed   out   in   the




“CCH Canadian  Ltd.   v.   Law  Society   of  Upper  Canada”   in   2004,








































appears   particularly   instructive   because   it   exemplifies   how   a











specific   exceptions   regime,   than   to   the  American   fair   use   regime.
Indeed, although both fair use and fair dealing provisions rely on a
“fairness”   standard   (according   to   a   number   of   codified   or   judicial
factors), unlike their fair use cousin, fair dealing exceptions are not
open   with   regard   to   the   purposes   of   the   use:   they   specify   an
exhaustive   list   of   purposes,   just   as   European   exceptions   do68.
Moreover, it was generally admitted that Canadian fair dealing (as








“the   fair   dealing   exception   is   perhaps   more   properly
understood   as   an   integral   part   of   the  Copyright  Act   than





order   to   maintain   the   proper   balance   between   the   rights   of   a











the  Court   added   that   “Both   owner   rights   and   user   rights   should
therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial





The   reasoning   of   the  Court   is   quite   straightforward:   if   copyright





dealing  “appears  to  be  inching closer  to   fair  use”75,   it  hasn't  quite
turned   into   a   truly   open   exception:   the   list   of   purposes   is   still
considered as exhaustive. However, the constraints of that exhaustive





analogous   cases.   The   new   Canadian   fair   dealing   post­CCH   can
therefore be described as a “semi­open” exception.

































Finally,   the   Alberta   (Education)   v.  Access   Copyright81  case
constitutes perhaps the most striking illustration of the failings of the





































studying”,   the   court   therefore   overturned   the   Copyright   Board
decision.
Admittedly, in all of these cases, the Supreme Court's application of
the   fair  dealing   exception   tends   to   rely  heavily  on   the   expression
“research or private study”. Let us note however that before the 2012
copyright reform (introducing the purposes of “education, parody or
satire”),   the   available  purposes   in   the   fair   dealing   exception  were
rather scarce,  as  the  law only allowed  fair  dealing  for purposes  of
“research or private study”, “criticism or review”, and “news reporting”
(the two latter purposes having only been introduced in 1997). It is
therefore   not   surprising   that   the   Court   used   the   legal   ground
available to it. Of course, in the hypothesis of a transposition of such
a   semi­open   exception   regime   in  Europe,  with   up   to   21   possible
exceptions available for interpretation, such an over­emphasis on one
particular purpose appears implausible.







certainly   undermine   legal   certainty   if   the   courts   did   not   address






the  Canadian   approach   is   comparable   to   a   number   of   legislative
proposals made by European scholars. The proposal for a European

























style   exhaustive   enumeration”89.   It   also   features   a   reversal   of   the
three­step   test   as   an   instrument   of   flexibility,   as   some   have
advocated90.
A similar proposal has also been made by Martin Senftleben, who












is   particularly   interesting   with   the   Canadian   approach   is   that
transposing it in European law would require only minimal changes.
The   Canadian   Supreme   Court   did   it   in   two   moves:   first,   by




















limitations.  The   exact   status   of   exceptions   and   limitations   under
European law as well as under French or Belgian copyright law, has
always been rather unclear. For a major part of the doctrine, their
status   is   quite   precarious:   exceptions   and   limitations   are   often
considered as mere legal forbearances, or at most as an affirmative
defense92. While others defend the idea that exceptions and limitations
should  be   considered  as  user   rights93,   this   interpretation  has  been
clearly rejected by the French Court of cassation94
Arguments for a protected status for exceptions and limitations. –








































from   the   duty   of   states   to   protect,   promote   and   implement
fundamental   rights,   then   surely   exceptions   and   limitations   should
enjoy a certain level of protection. Admittedly, this argument would
only hold for those exceptions and limitations that do have a basis in





copyright   owner   and   users’   interests”   and   the   recognition   of
exceptions as users' rights. This relies on the Court statement in the






justification   specific   to   an   Anglo­American   tradition,   and
fundamentally at odds with the purely “natural rights” justification of
a continental European tradition. However, the alleged gap between
these   two   traditions   is   often   exaggerated.   At   their   origins,   both
traditions   result   from   a   compromise   between   natural   law   and
























which   sees   the   erosion   of   the   influence   of   the   “personalist”
justification,   and   the   rising   influence   of   the   instrumental








Therefore,   if   we   admit   that   copyright   law  must   strike   a   balance












































author's   and  user's   right  have   an   equal   status   has   an   important
implication, embodied in the Court's second and final move towards a






users'   rights,   we   must   therefore   reject   the   strict   interpretation
doctrine.
The CJEU's justification of the strict  interpretation doctrine. –  In
EU   law,   the   strict   interpretation   doctrine   has   been   notoriously
endorsed by the CJEU in its Infopaq I decision110. The Court invokes
two arguments to support the idea that exceptions and limitations





























The  strict   interpretation doctrine   for   limitations  and exceptions   is
well­known in many copyright law regimes. The CJEU presents it as
deriving from a more general principle in EU law112, which could be
considered   a   variant   of   the   Roman   law   maxim  exceptio   est
strictissimae interpretationis113. However, in the legal literature, this
interpretation principle is increasingly disputed, as some argue that
legal  methodology  does  not   generally  prescribe   that   exceptions  be
interpreted strictly merely because of their status as exceptions114. A
more   radical   critique   would   point   out   that   such   a   principle   of
interpretation   reflects   the   tendency   to   privilege   syntax   over   the
meaning and purpose of the law which is a major shortcoming of legal
formalism, that will often lead to contradictions115.
In   our   opinion,   this   issue   is   not   a   mere   question   of   formalistic
































scope of   the  exclusive  rights of   the  author,  and of  the  correlative
rights   of   the   public.   If   copyright   law   is   defined   by   a   balance   of






that   copyright   law  is  an  exception  to  a  more  general  principle  of
freedom, an “island of property in an ocean of liberty” 117. Framed in
that way, the issue of the strict interpretation doctrine would lead to














taken   in   a   quantitative   interpretation,   as   “clearly   defined”  and






















other exceptional  circumstance”121.  Moreover,   it condones a reading
where article 5(5) also binds the judge, and not only the legislator.
Although the peculiar wording of the test in the EU directive gives
some weight to that  interpretation,   it  is not clear whether such a
departure from the standard three­step test in copyright treaties was
intended   by   the   EU   legislator   absent   any   explicit   mention   in

















used,   but   rather   focuses   on   the   result   of   the   interpretation   of
exceptions: is it such that does not cover certain special cases, or that



























exceptions  at   stake.   In  Premier  League,   the  CJEU  stated   that   it
resulted from recital 31 that the interpretation of the exception “must enable
the  effectiveness  of  the  exception  (...)  to  be  safeguarded  and  permit















From   this   overview,   the   Court's   reasonings   with   regard   to   the
interpretation of exceptions appears largely inconsistent. On the one




neutralize   that   strict   interpretation   doctrine,   and   relax   the
interpretation   of   the   exception   at   hand.  While   the   Court   seems
formally   committed   to   the   orthodoxy   of   the   strict   interpretation
doctrine,   it   is   in   fact  alternatively  invoking  it  and neutralizing  it,
depending on the cases. It is as if the Court realized that the strict
interpretation doctrine,  applied as  a  general   rule of   interpretation,
was   imposing   an   unreasonable   straitjacket   on   the   exceptions   and
limitations to copyright law. One might argue that the Court should

















copyright­holders.   From   there,   the   Court   could   easily   make   the
second move and reject the strict interpretation doctrine. The CJEU
could then walk in the footsteps of the Canadian Supreme Court, and





















directive,   by   taking   inspiration   from   the   legislative   proposals
mentioned  above128.  And  it   is  not  implausible that the momentum
created   by   the   adoption   of   fair   use   provisions   by   an   increasing
number   of   countries   will   generate   the   impulse   for   the   European













European   framework   of   limitatively   enumerated   and   strictly
interpreted   exceptions   and   limitations   was   way   too   narrow   to
compensate for the far­reach of exclusive rights. 
The issue of transformative uses has largely been a neglected issue in
copyright   law.  Not  only  does   it  appear   that   the   spaces   for  many
emerging   practices   are   lacking,   but   even   the   more   traditional






European   copyright   law.  Admittedly,   it  does  not   go   all   the  way
towards an American­style fair use exception. A semi­open exception
would still be constrained by the template cases provided by law: the





of   a   closed   system   of   exception   and   the   flexibility   of   an   open
exception,   a   solution   that  might  be  more   appealing   for  European
lawyers.  If  such a compromise  is  indeed possible,   then  it could no
longer be argued that  introducing more flexibility in the European






crucial   for   copyright   law   to   prove   that   it   can   evolve,   and
accommodate the evolution of social and cultural practices regarding
intellectual creation.
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